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“MORE THAN TANGENTIAL”: WHEN DOES THE
PUBLIC HAVE A RIGHT TO ACCESS JUDICIAL
RECORDS?
Jordan Elias*
➢ Public accountability requires open proceedings and
access to documents filed with the courts. The strong
policy favoring access to judicial records creates a
presumption against sealing documents without a
compelling reason.
➢ The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that
this presumption of access arises when a proceeding
relates “more than tangentially” to the merits. This is a
low standard under which many types of motions qualify
for the compelling reasons test.
➢ With too much litigation occurring in secret, courts can
use the “more than tangential” standard proactively to
keep electronic case dockets available to citizens.
INTRODUCTION
In Center for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Group, LLC, the Ninth
Circuit held that, absent compelling reasons to seal, courts must
ensure public access to evidence submitted with a motion “more
than tangentially related to the merits” of the case.1 Because issues
litigated to a decision usually relate more than tangentially to the
merits of a case, this holding creates presumptive access to nearly
everything filed with a court.
*

J.D., Stanford Law School, 2003; B.A. magna cum laude, Yale College, 1998.
The views and research in this Article are my own.
1
Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1101 (9th Cir.
2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 38 (2016).
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The Ninth Circuit stressed that a proceeding relates more than
tangentially to the merits when it may affect the parties’ substantive
rights.2 That is true of most non-discovery motions for the simple
reason that parties have less reason to fund or file a motion if it is
unlikely to advance a claim or defense.
Since 2016 the rule of Center for Auto Safety has taken hold,
been cited in hundreds of cases, and resulted in more liberal use of
the “compelling reasons” standard.3 Before Center for Auto Safety,
courts within the Ninth Circuit were divided on whether a motion to
certify a class carried the presumption of access.4 But courts
applying the “more than tangentially related” rule have consistently
held that the public has a right to access the record at class
certification.5 As a result, the compelling reasons test applies—
rather than the “good cause” standard of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26, which is more lenient in permitting sealing.
2

See id. at 1098–1101 (reviewing case law and concluding that the
presumption of public access to judicial records applies if a decision on the
underlying motion or proceeding could adjudicate the litigants’ substantive
rights).
3
Courts have broadly applied the “compelling reasons” test after Center for
Auto Safety. See, e.g., United States v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., No. CV 08-6403GHK (AGRx), 2016 WL 11673226, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2016) (denying
request to seal initial pleadings). See generally discussion infra Part II.
4
Compare, e.g., Nygren v. Hewlett-Packard Co., C07-05793 JW (HRL),
2010 WL 2107434, at *1–3 (N.D. Cal. May 25, 2010) (applying Rule 26 standard
to class certification motion), and Pecover v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. C 08-2820
VRW, 2010 WL 8742757, at *25–26 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2010) (same), with
Labrador v. Seattle Mortg. Co., No. 08-2270 SC, 2010 WL 3448523, at *2 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 1, 2010) (applying compelling reasons standard).
5
See Adtrader, Inc. v. Google LLC, No. 17-CV-07082-BLF, 2020 WL
6387381, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2020) (“This Court follows numerous other
district courts within the Ninth Circuit in concluding that the compelling reasons
standard applies to motions to seal documents relating to class certification.”);
Fitzhenry-Russell v. Dr. Pepper Snapple Grp., Inc., 326 F.R.D. 592, 617 (N.D.
Cal. 2018) (because a class certification motion is “more than tangentially related
to the merits of the case,” the compelling reasons standard applies); Moussouris
v. Microsoft Corp., No. 15-CV-1483 JLR, 2018 WL 1159251, at *2–4 (W.D.
Wash. Feb. 16, 2018) (applying the compelling reasons standard to a class
certification motion under Center for Auto Safety), report & rec. adopted, 2018
WL 1157997 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 1, 2018); Baker v. SeaWorld Entm’t, Inc., No.
14CV2129-MMA (AGS), 2017 WL 5029612, at *2–3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2017).
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This Law and Policy Article accepts the “more than tangentially
related” standard as a reality in the Ninth Circuit and considers what
proceedings qualify under it for the presumption of access. Some of
these litigation postures are well established (trial; summary
judgment), and others addressed in Part II also touch on the merits:
evidentiary exclusion, preliminary injunction, class certification,
and, in patent cases, Markman proceedings. Before the discussion
turns to these motions, Part I analyzes the open-records policy and
its history and application. Framing these sections is an argument,
informed by my work as a practitioner, for increased vigilance by
courts in response to the secretive practices that now attend business
litigation.
The prevailing practice is to enter a protective order that results
in the parties conducting discovery in private. These standardized
“umbrella” protective orders, endorsed even in some jurisdictions’
local rules,6 permit designating entire sets of documents as
confidential. The resulting blanket over-designation has an inertial
effect, preventing the press and the public from seeing nonconfidential material even when it has been filed with the court.7
Litigating in secret, formalized by protective order practices, has
become accepted and is now the norm for several other reasons:
“First, . . . counsel may fear losing a client or subjecting himself to
a malpractice action if sealing is not demanded. Second, opposing
counsel may believe that not acquiescing to secrecy requests will
delay discovery or foil the settlement.”8 Although embarrassment
cannot justify secretive proceedings unless disclosure would cause
competitive or other undue harm, it is precisely the risk of offending

6

See United Nuclear Corp. v. Cranford Ins. Co., 905 F.2d 1424, 1427 (10th
Cir. 1990) (observing that “[t]hese stipulated ‘blanket’ protective orders are
becoming standard practice in complex cases.”); see, e.g., Washington Federal
Rules of Court, Local Civil Rule 26 (“encourag[ing]” parties to adopt a “model
protective order, available on the court’s website” and requiring “[p]arties that
wish to depart from the model order [to] provide the court with a redlined version
identifying departures from the model”); Kansas Federal Court Rules, Selected
Guidelines and Notices, Guidelines for Agreed Protective Orders for the District
of Kansas.
7
See sources cited infra notes 17, 41 & 176–177.
8
Hon. Lloyd Doggett & Michael Mucchetti, Public Access to Public Courts:
Discouraging Secrecy in the Public Interest, 69 TEX. L. REV. 643, 646 (1991).
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the other side that can lead a party to redact heavily. The attorney or
paralegal doing the sealing work wants no part of trouble and has
every reason to avoid provoking accusations from opposing
counsel.9 Reinforcing a “when in doubt, redact” mentality is the
understanding that a sealing dispute could distract or divert the
party’s focus in the case and drain resources beyond the sealing
work itself. This reflexive accommodation of sealing among parties
warrants an equally firm judicial counteraction.
Voicing recent concern over “displacing the high bar for sealing
orders with the low bar for protective orders,” the Fifth Circuit
sounded the alarm that “increasingly, courts are sealing documents
in run-of-the-mill cases where the parties simply prefer to keep
things under wraps.”10 For nearly ten years Bill Cosby was able to
keep the public from learning of his deposition testimony that he
drugged women with quaaludes to take advantage of them.11 It took
a decade as well for key information learned in discovery about the
failing tires at issue in the Bridgestone/Firestone/Ford litigation to
come to light.12 The public now has a need for all manner of
evidence ranging from trading records showing market
manipulation13 to public health records reflecting pandemic

9

See, e.g., Matt Stoller, When Google’s Fancy Lawyers Screw Up and
Jeopardize Sheryl Sandberg, at $1500/Hour, BIG (Apr. 10, 2021),
https://mattstoller.substack.com/p/when-googles-fancy-lawyers-screw (alluding
to professed outrage by parties who act as though “revealing public information
about big business is some sort of scandal”).
10
Le v. Exeter Fin. Corp., 990 F.3d 410, 417, 421 (5th Cir. 2021).
11
See Graham Bowley & Ravi Somaiya, Bill Cosby Admission About
Quaaludes Offers Accusers Vindication, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/08/business/bill-cosby-said-in-2005-heobtained-drugs-to-give-to-women.html?ref=topics.
12
See Dustin B. Benham, Dirty Secrets: The First Amendment in ProtectiveOrder Litigation, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1781, 1785–86 (2014).
13
See, e.g., United States v. Walsh, 723 F.3d 802, 808 (7th Cir. 2013)
(government used trading records to calculate loss from defendants’ investment
fraud in foreign currency exchange market).
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response measures,14 from tax records15 to product safety
information16 and the list continues. Yet cases often drag on or settle
before trial, forever shielding relevant evidence from the public.17
In response to these conditions, courts can use the “more than
tangential” rule proactively, as through orders to show cause, if the
litigants merely assume the secrecy of records will be maintained.
Companies’ awareness that their records may be disclosed promotes
compliance; yet open proceedings can only be achieved when the
courts insist on them.
14

See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Newman & Holtzinger, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d
151, 160 (Ct. App. 1995) (“Because the judicial process is frequently the avenue
by which the public and regulatory agencies learn of significant health and safety
hazards, blocking this avenue may prove detrimental to the public well-being.”).
15
See, e.g., AmerGen Energy Co., LLC by & through Exelon Generation
Co., LLC v. United States, 115 Fed. Cl. 132, 142–43 (2014) (refusing to redact or
seal tax returns and related correspondence in suit involving tax treatment of
nuclear plant transactions); In re Rahr Malting Co., 632 N.W.2d 572, 574–76
(Minn. 2001) (denying petition that challenged tax court’s unsealing of financial
data of company whose CEO “stated only in conclusory terms that disclosure of
the data would be ‘devastating’ and affect the ‘survivability’ of the company” by
enabling customers to reduce its profits and competitors to undercut its pricing).
16
See, e.g., Naramore v. Daimler Trucks N. Am., LLC, No. 1:18-CV-156
(LAG), 2019 WL 6037716, at *1–2 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 3, 2019) (denying request to
strike provision in protective order allowing vehicle-related information obtained
in discovery to be shared with the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration and other potential plaintiffs).
17
See Hon. Craig Smith et al., Finding a Balance Between Securing
Confidentiality and Preserving Court Transparency: A Re-Visit of Rule 76a and
Its Application to Unfiled Discovery, 69 S.M.U. L. REV. 309, 311–13 (2016)
(stating that “broad protective orders and silent settlement agreements keep
‘confidential’ information out of public view, despite the fact that this information
may have a substantial effect on the public’s interest in health or safety. The risk
of disclosing harmful information to the public is the economic incentive to keep
it a secret.”); Anne E. Ralph, Narrative-Erasing Procedure, 18 NEV. L.J. 573, 607
(2018) (noting “significant losses and costs” to the public from “the everincreasing rates of settlement”); Benjamin Sunshine & Víctor Abel Pereyra,
Access-to-Justice v. Efficiency: An Empirical Study of Settlement Rates After
Twombly & Iqbal, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 357, 387, 398 (2015) (finding that
“[s]ettlements in federal civil cases occurred at a higher rate in the post-Iqbal era
[after May 2009] as compared to the pre-Twombly era [before May 2007]” and
that “most settlement terms are kept secret”). Also limiting access to records, the
government can be slow in processing FOIA requests for information.
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I. THE “COMPELLING REASONS” STANDARD OF ACCESS
A. The Presumption of Access
The First Amendment and the common law guarantee a right to
inspect materials submitted and used in court cases.18 Because
“courts are public institutions” “their proceedings should be public
unless a compelling argument for secrecy can be made.”19 Access to
proceedings is an implied entitlement under the First Amendment,
whose guarantees collectively depend on the open administration of
justice.20 In criminal cases, where the Sixth Amendment comes into
play, courts may weigh the constitutional right of access against the
accused’s right to a fair trial,21 while in civil cases courts bypass the
18

Republic of Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 949 F.2d 653, 659
(3d Cir. 1991). The rule at common law was that “[a]n inspection of the records
of judicial proceedings kept in the courts of the country, is held to be the right of
any citizen.” Brewer v. Watson, 61 Ala. 310, 311 (1878) (citation omitted). The
requirement of public access to judicial proceedings has roots in a 1267 English
statute, see Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1068 (3d Cir. 1984),
and the legal concept matured in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, largely
in reaction to secret Star Chamber prosecutions, see In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257,
268–70 (1948).
19
Arkwright Mut. Ins. v. Garrett & West, Inc., 782 F. Supp. 376, 381 (N.D.
Ill. 1991) (emphasis added).
20
See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575–76 (1980)
(“In guaranteeing freedoms such as those of speech and press, the First
Amendment can be read as protecting the right of everyone to attend trials so as
to give meaning to those explicit guarantees . . . . Free speech carries with it some
freedom to listen.”); Greenan v. Greenan, 91 A.3d 909, 914 (Conn. Ct. App. 2014)
(right of public access to proceedings is fundamental).
21
See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 564; Press-Enterprise Co. v.
Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 7–10 (1986); see also Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S.
209, 213 (2010) (noting that “[t]he extent to which the First and Sixth Amendment
public trial rights are coextensive is an open question”); United States v. Thomas,
745 F. Supp. 499, 502 (M.D. Tenn. 1990) (finding the common law presumption
of access to judicial records outweighed by other factors, including the likely
impairment from disclosure to the accused’s right to a fair trial). In Wood v. Ryan,
759 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2014), both the majority and dissenting opinions discuss
the constitutional right of access to criminal proceedings. Evidently agreeing with
the dissent, the Supreme Court summarily vacated the court’s injunction that
would have halted an inmate’s execution until the State of Arizona disclosed the
name and source of the lethal drugs. See Ryan v. Wood, 573 U.S. 976 (2014).
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constitutional issue and enforce the common law right since
“common law . . . can of course go beyond constitutional
prescriptions.”22
There is a “strong presumption in favor of public access
reflecting a first principle that the people have the right to know
what is done in their courts.”23 The public “has a right to every
man’s evidence,” except for privileged materials, and privileges are
narrowly construed24 because they impede what the Supreme Court
called “the search for truth.”25 Correspondingly, the presumption of
access “should apply to any motion related to a matter which the
public has a right to know about and evaluate.”26 But this

22

In re Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325, 1340
(D.C. Cir. 1985).
23
In re Providian Credit Card Cases, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 833, 847 (Ct. App.
2002) (quoting In re Shortridge, 99 Cal. 526, 530 (1893)); accord Mosallem v.
Berenson, 76 A.D.3d 345, 348 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) (“Under New York law,
there is a broad presumption that the public is entitled to access to judicial
proceedings and court records.”).
24
Pierce Cnty., Wash. v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 145 (2003) (reversing a
decision that “conflict[ed] with our rule that, when possible, privileges should be
construed narrowly.”); MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 72 (3d ed. 1984) (pointing
out that the effect of privileges—“the most familiar are the rule protecting against
self-incrimination and those shielding the confidentiality of communications
between husband and wife, attorney and client, and physician and patient”—is
“clearly inhibitive; rather than facilitating the illumination of truth, they shut out
the light.”).
25
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709–10 (1974). Courts “generally
do not condition enforcement of this right on a proprietary interest in the
document or upon a need for it as evidence in a lawsuit.” Nixon v. Warner
Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978). Hence, the media have standing to
assert the right of access to court records and proceedings. See Globe Newspaper
Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 609 n.25 (1982) (stating that “representatives
of the press and general public ‘must be given an opportunity to be heard on the
question of their exclusion.’”) (citation omitted); In re Associated Press, 162 F.3d
503, 508 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that “the [p]ress ought to have been able to
intervene in order to present arguments against limitations on the constitutional
or common law right of access.”).
26
Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1100 (9th Cir.
2016) (citing Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion Techs., Inc., 998 F.2d 157, 164
(3d Cir. 1993) (alteration and quotation marks omitted)).
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presumption “generally only extends to documents that have been
filed with the court.”27
Presumptive access to the courts “promotes the public’s
understanding of the judicial process and of significant public
events,”28 furnishing a needed check on rulings.29 Justice Holmes,
highlighting the “vast importance” of open records, expounded that
“it is of the highest moment that those who administer justice should
always act under the sense of public responsibility, and that every
citizen should be able to satisfy himself with his own eyes as to the
mode in which a public duty is performed.”30 Put rhetorically,
“[h]ow can the public know that courts are deciding cases fairly and
impartially if it doesn’t know what is being decided?”31
Judicial “records often provide important, sometimes the only,
bases or explanations for a court’s decision.”32 Open proceedings in
27

Star Tribune v. Minnesota Twins P’ship, 659 N.W.2d 287, 296 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2003) (citing State ex rel. Mitsubishi Heavy Indus. Am., Inc. v. Cir. Ct., 605
N.W.2d 868, 874 (Wis. 2000)); see Bond v. Utreras, 585 F.3d 1061, 1075 (7th
Cir. 2009) (“The rights of the public kick in when material produced during
discovery is filed with the court.”).
28
Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1096 (quoting Valley Broad. Co. v. U.S.
Dist. Court—D. Nev., 798 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1986)).
29
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C., 710 F.2d 1165, 1178 (6th
Cir. 1983); see also United States v. Sealed Search Warrants, 868 F.3d 385, 395
(5th Cir. 2017).
30
Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392, 394 (1884). Serving several purposes,
“open judicial processes . . . protect against judicial, prosecutorial, and police
abuse; provide a means for citizens to obtain information about the criminal
justice system and the performance of public officials; and safeguard the integrity
of the courts.” Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 448 (1979) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Similarly, the Sixth Amendment
guarantees a criminal defendant a public trial so “that the public may see he is
fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned, and that the presence of interested
spectators may keep his triers keenly alive to a sense of their responsibility and to
the importance of their functions.” Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984)
(citations omitted).
31
BP Exploration & Prod., Inc. v. Claimant ID 100246928, 920 F.3d 209,
210 (5th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted); see also Le v. Exeter Fin. Corp., 990 F.3d
410, 417 (5th Cir. 2021) (“[A]ccessibility enhances legitimacy, the assurance that
things are on the level.”).
32
Oliner v. Kontrabecki, 745 F.3d 1024, 1025 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation
omitted).
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“civil trials, no less than criminal trials” ensure “the free discussion
of governmental affairs”33 and even unopposed motions to seal the
courtroom have failed.34 On the other hand, “[i]n all experience,
secret tribunals have exhibited abuses” not committed by courts
using public procedures.35 So “[a]t bottom,” access to judicial
records “reflects the antipathy of a democratic country to the notion
of ‘secret law,’ inaccessible to those who are governed by that
law.”36 At the same time, grand jury proceedings are traditionally
secret37 and a trial judge has discretion to enforce reasonable time,

33

Publicker Indus. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1070 (3d Cir. 1984); Matter of
Cont’l Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308 (7th Cir. 1984). Access to judicial
records is necessary as well so that citizens will accept court judgments instead of
taking the law into their own hands. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,
448 U.S. 555, 571 (1980); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501,
509 (1984) (explaining that “an outlet is provided”). In addition, open proceedings
may lead witnesses to “voluntarily come forward and give important testimony.”
In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 271 n.24 (1948). Open records also discourage parties
from denying the existence of documents in subsequent litigation, thereby
encouraging “greater integrity from attorneys and their clients.” Republic of
Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 949 F.2d 653, 664 (3d Cir. 1991)
(quoting Hon. Lloyd Doggett & Michael Mucchetti, Public Access to Public
Courts: Discouraging Secrecy in the Public Interest, 69 TEX. L. REV. 643, 650
(1991)).
34
See, e.g., United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 513 F.3d
1085, 1115 n.54 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting that “[o]ral proceedings . . . were open to
the public” after the panel denied an unopposed motion to seal the courtroom and
then denied an unopposed motion for reconsideration), vacated on other grounds
en banc, 621 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2010).
35
Publicker Indus., 733 F.2d at 1070 (quoting 6 J. Wigmore, Evidence §
1834, at 438 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1976)).
36
In re Leopold, 964 F.3d 1121, 1127 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
37
See Douglas Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops Nw., 441 U.S. 211, 218–19 &
nn. 9–10 (1979); FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(6) (providing that records “relating to
grand-jury proceedings must be kept under seal to the extent and as long as
necessary to prevent the unauthorized disclosure of a matter occurring before a
grand jury”). Courts have also traditionally sealed various proceedings involving
the interests of minors, see Hynes v. Karassik, 393 N.E.2d 1015, 1018 (N.Y.
1979), and transcripts of in camera bench conferences, see Pennsylvania v. Long,
922 A.2d 892, 898 (Pa. 2007).
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place, and manner restrictions on courtroom attendance and
behavior.38
Courts apply the strong presumption of access using a
compelling reasons test by which material on file must be made
public absent a compelling reason that overcomes the public’s
traditional right of access.39 Under this standard, the “‘strong
presumption in favor of access’ is the starting point” and “sharply
tips the balance in favor of production”40—a point that case
participants too often overlook in filing or maintaining under seal
documents designated as confidential for discovery purposes.41 To
overcome the common law presumption, the sealing proponent must
demonstrate a compelling reason to protect each record.42
B. The Presumption’s Strength: How Important the
Dispute? How Impactful the Decision? How Central
the Material?
The public interest in accessing judicial records expands and
contracts according to the circumstances.43 Courts ask three
questions overall to gauge the strength of this right: (1) how
38

See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 581 n.18; Illinois v. Allen, 397
U.S. 337, 343 (1970).
39
See Foltz v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. 331 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th
Cir. 2003); Wash. Post v. Robinson, 935 F.2d 282, 287 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
40
Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178, 1180 (9th
Cir. 2006) (quoting Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1135); see also Hagestad v. Tragesser, 49
F.3d 1430, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995).
41
See Seth Katsuya Endo, Contracting for Confidential Discovery, 53 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1249, 1288 (2020) (detailing an empirical study of ninety-five
stipulated protective orders entered in federal court that revealed a “common
mistake of law . . . wherein the standard for filing materials under seal is conflated
with that for keeping unfiled discovery confidential”); Le v. Exeter Fin. Corp.,
990 F.3d 410, 420 (5th Cir. 2021) (noting that “[t]his conflation error—equating
the standard for keeping unfiled discovery confidential with the standard for
placing filed materials under seal—is a common one and one that over-privileges
secrecy and devalues transparency”).
42
Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1135–36 (quoting Rushford v. New Yorker Mag., 846
F.2d 249, 252 (4th Cir. 1988)). Some of these compelling reasons are mentioned
below, in Part I.D.
43
See United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1049–50 (2d Cir. 1995)
(describing this “continuum”).
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important is the dispute; (2) what is the likely impact of the decision;
and (3) how central is the material to the case and its disposition?44
First, the importance of the case naturally modifies the public
interest in accessing the records.45 Courts have declared that
“litigation with millions at stake, ought to be litigated openly”46 and
that the need for access may be “particularly compelling” in class
actions where a segment of the public belongs to the class. 47 Civil
litigation “often exposes the need for governmental action or
correction.”48 Thus, a Texas law requires consideration of “any
probable adverse effect that sealing will have upon the general
public health or safety.”49
Second, in the Ninth Circuit’s approach, the public’s right of
access principally hinges on the likelihood of harm from the
underlying decision to a party’s position (i.e., prejudice).50 Under
Rule 26(c), evidence may be developed free from public inspection
44

See infra notes 45–58.
See Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 788 (3d Cir. 1994)
(recognizing that when a case “involves issues or parties of a public nature, and
involves matters of legitimate public concern, that should be a factor weighing
against entering or maintaining an order of confidentiality”); cf. Jeffrey W.
Sheehan, Confidences Worth Keeping: Rebalancing Legitimate Interests in
Litigants’ Private Information in an Era of Open-Access Courts, 21 VAND. J. ENT.
& TECH. L. 905, 909 (2019) (“Courts remain public institutions even when the
public takes little or no interest in a particular case.”).
46
In re High Sulfur Content Gasoline Prods. Liab. Litig., 517 F.3d 220, 230
(5th Cir. 2008).
47
In re Cendant Corp., 260 F.3d 183, 193 (3d Cir. 2001); see also Jenkins v.
United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 32–33 (5th Cir. 1968).
48
Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 258 (7th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
49
TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a(1)(a)(2); see also Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v.
Newman & Holtzinger, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 151, 160 (Ct. App. 1995) (“Because the
judicial process is frequently the avenue by which the public and regulatory
agencies learn of significant health and safety hazards, blocking this avenue may
prove detrimental to the public well-being.”). In re Roman Catholic Archbishop
of Portland, 661 F.3d 417, 426–27 (9th Cir. 2011) (reversing decision to publicly
release personnel file of 85-year-old priest who had retired, but affirming decision
to release allegations of child abuse against another priest, still active, given
strong public interest in disclosure).
50
See United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1049 (2d Cir. 1995);
Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 1986).
45
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or intrusion, but this discovery policy no longer applies if a party
submits evidence with a motion capable of adjudicating the
litigants’ substantive rights.51 Courts by the same token may assign
greater protection to information discovered via compulsory process
from a nonparty whose rights are not directly implicated in the
case.52 In general, while protective orders serve to exclude the public
from depositions and protect interrogatory responses,53 citizens are
entitled to view materials filed with a non-discovery motion that
could prejudice a party, “whether or not [the motion is]
characterized as dispositive.”54

51

See Foltz v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135–36
(9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Rushford v. New Yorker Mag., 846 F.2d 249, 252 (4th
Cir. 1988)).
52
See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 34–35 (1984) (stating
that “relevant information in the hands of third parties may be subject to
discovery” but that “discovery also may seriously implicate privacy interests of
litigants and third parties.”); see, e.g., Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.—Nampa, Inc.
v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., No. 1:12-CV-00560-BLW, 2014 WL 3101716, at
*5–8 (D. Idaho July 3, 2014) (finding compelling reasons to seal “proprietary
information” obtained via subpoena that “played no role in the Court’s ultimate
decision, and thus is not necessary for the public to understand the Court’s
analysis,” and deeming it “important” that nonparties “did not provide the
information voluntarily”), on reconsideration in part, 2015 WL 632311 (D. Idaho
Feb. 13, 2015); Marsteller v. MD Helicopter Inc., No. CV-14-01788-PHX-DLR,
2018 WL 4679645, at *2 (D. Ariz. Sept. 28, 2018) (unsealing confidential
information of a litigant while declining to seal that of non-litigants); Epic Games,
Inc. v. Apple Inc., No. 4:20-cv-05640-YGR (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2021), ECF No.
594 (in trial context, granting nonparty Spotify’s motion to seal user and platform
data, “the release of which would result in competitive harm,” but denying
nonparty Netflix’s motion to seal customer payment statistics “reflect[ing]
areas . . . not only highly relevant to the Court’s determination in this action,
but . . . hotly contested.”); Bertroche v. Mercy Physician Assocs., Inc., No. 18CV-59-CJW-KEM, 2019 WL 7761810, at *2 (N.D. Iowa Dec. 16, 2019) (holding
that “[t]he non-litigants . . . have a right to keep their personal information
private.”).
53
See Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 33 (holding that “restraints placed on
discovered, but not yet admitted, information are not a restriction on a
traditionally public source of information.”). But see infra note 113.
54
Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1100 (9th Cir.
2016) (emphasis added) (quoting Romero v. Drummond Co., Inc., 480 F.3d 1234,
1245–46 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Amodeo, 71 F.3d at 1048)).
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Third, given the public’s strong interest in understanding the
grounds for judicial decisions, its right of access strengthens to the
degree the evidence touches on central issues or subject matter,
which is more likely when the underlying motion does the same.
Thus the access right becomes “particularly strong where the
[evidentiary] materials at issue play a substantial role in determining
a party’s substantive rights.”55 In one recent case, the court denied
Ford’s request to seal its engineer’s comments criticizing the
performance and reliability of allegedly defective car software.56
The court wrote that “[s]uch criticism may be a kind of ‘analysis’
but that does not convert it into confidential information entitled to
be sealed. Even if it did, the public obviously has a strong interest in
these materials because they relate directly to the merits.”57 In
another case, the court declined to seal information because it was
“necessary to understand plaintiffs’ theory of liability.”58
C. When Does the Presumption Apply? Center for Auto
Safety Distills an Expansive Rule
The “more than tangential” rule installs a liberal policy favoring
more open dockets considering that any number of litigation stages
or motions can relate more than tangentially to the merits of a claim
or defense. Dispositive motions necessarily satisfy this test, but a
motion need not be dispositive to concern the merits more than
tangentially; the open-records presumption arises by virtue of a
motion’s probable significance in disposing of the matter or in
affecting a party’s rights or obligations. This is a very low standard,
and there was very little law on this subject just fifty years ago.
In its 1978 Nixon II opinion, the Supreme Court found the law
of public access undeveloped, concluding it was “difficult to distill
from the relatively few judicial decisions a comprehensive
definition of what is referred to as the common-law right of access
55

United States v. Vazquez, 31 F. Supp. 2d 85, 87 (D. Conn. 1998).
In re MyFord Touch Consumer Litig., No. 13-cv-03072-EMC (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 2, 2018), ECF No. 400.
57
Id. Moreover, the court added, “Ford cannot stake out a litigation position
that the software was not defective and then seek to conceal records where its
employees, engineers, and executives expressed the contrary view.” Id.
58
Maldonado v. Apple, Inc., 333 F.R.D. 175, 194 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
56
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or to identify all the factors to be weighed in determining whether
access is appropriate.”59 In 1980, the journalist Nat Hentoff posited
that the Supreme Court’s public-access precedents might
“eventually lead to a much broader definition of access.”60 And
indeed, since then this doctrine has developed in the direction of
openness.
Two early 1980s cases from the Second Circuit applied the
common-law presumption of access. In the Abscam case later
portrayed in the movie “American Hustler,” the court permitted
television networks to copy and televise videotapes entered into
evidence at a criminal trial, stating that only “the most extraordinary
circumstances [would] justify restrictions on the opportunity of
those not physically in attendance at the courtroom to see and hear
the evidence . . . .”61 Next, in a stockholder derivative suit, the court
unsealed a report by a bank’s special litigation committee revealing
its internal operations.62 The report, the court explained, was “no
longer a private document. It is part of a court record. Since it is the
basis for the adjudication, only the most compelling reasons can
justify the total foreclosure of public and professional scrutiny.”63
The doctrine concerning open records then went through a
period of sustained development. In 1984, the Sixth Circuit ruled
that tobacco companies could not keep secret FTC documents
disclosing the true tar and nicotine levels of cigarettes. “Simply
showing that the information would harm the company’s reputation
is not sufficient,” the court held.64 The Third and Seventh Circuits
soon agreed that the presumption of access applies in civil as well
as criminal cases.65 In 1987, the First Circuit concluded the
presumption applies to documents filed on a docket “in the course
59

Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598–99 (1978).
NAT HENTOFF, THE FIRST FREEDOM: THE TUMULTUOUS HISTORY OF FREE
SPEECH IN AMERICA 240 (1980).
61
In re Application of Nat’l Broad. Co., 635 F.2d 945, 947, 952 (2d Cir.
1980).
62
Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982).
63
Id. at 894.
64
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C., 710 F.2d 1165, 1179–80
(6th Cir. 1983).
65
See Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1061, 1070–71 (3d
Cir. 1984); Matter of Cont’l Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308 (7th Cir. 1984).
60
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of adjudicatory proceedings.”66 And in 1988 the Fourth Circuit held
that once a party submits documents as “part of a dispositive motion,
such as a summary judgment motion, they lose their status of being
raw fruits of discovery.”67 By 1993, the Third Circuit had applied
the presumption of access to civil trial exhibits, material submitted
at summary judgment, transcripts of a preliminary injunction
hearing, and settlement documents and post-settlement motions
seeking to interpret and enforce the agreement.68 Commentators at
the time noted that within “the space of a decade” courts had
extended the access right to “an ever wider range of judicial
proceedings” along with “a variety of documents and materials
associated with” them.69
This post-Watergate case law recognizes that the presumption of
public access arises if a motion is literally or effectively casedispositive under the circumstances.70 The line of Ninth Circuit
cases culminating in Center for Auto Safety clarifies when the
presumption kicks in.
Not until 1999 did the Ninth Circuit squarely hold that the
presumption of access applies at summary judgment.71 The court
explained in 2003 that “summary judgment adjudicates substantive
66

F.T.C. v. Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830 F.2d 404, 409 (1st Cir. 1987).
Rushford v. New Yorker Mag., Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 252 (4th Cir. 1988)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab.
Litig., 98 F.R.D. 539, 544–45 (E.D.N.Y. 1983)).
68
See Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion Techs. Inc., 998 F.2d 157, 161,
165 (3d Cir. 1993) (recognizing a “presumptive right to public access to all
material filed in connection with nondiscovery pretrial motions, whether these
motions are case dispositive or not.”).
69
JEROME A. BARRON & C. THOMAS DIENES, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW 394
(Thomson West ed., 1993).
70
See In re Midland Nat’l Life Ins. Co. Annuity Sales Practices Litig., 686
F.3d 1115, 1119 (9th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (reasoning that the compelling
reasons test applied to a Daubert motion because it was “effectively dispositive”)
(internal quotation mark and citation omitted); Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of
Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding “good reasons to
distinguish between dispositive and non-dispositive motions”) (quoting Foltz v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003)).
71
San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court—N. Dist. (San Jose), 187
F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[W]e have never squarely held that the federal
common law right of public access extends to materials submitted in connection
with motions for summary judgment in civil cases prior to judgment.”).
67
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rights and serves as a substitute for trial.”72 In 2006, the court made
clear in its Kamakana decision that “dispositive pleadings and
attachments” give rise to the presumption.73 Then in 2012, the court
indicated that “dispositive” should be interpreted constructively
rather than technically, holding that a Daubert motion carried the
presumption despite being technically non-dispositive.74 In Center
for Auto Safety, a divided Ninth Circuit panel further held that the
presumption also arises if the underlying motion or proceeding
relates “more than tangentially” to the merits of a claim or defense.75
The documents at issue in Center for Auto Safety had been
submitted on the plaintiffs’ unsuccessful motion for a preliminary
injunction that would have required Chrysler to warn vehicle owners
and lessees of alleged safety risks from certain electrical systems.76
The court’s analysis filled a gap in the Eleventh Circuit’s “refined
approach” under which “material filed with discovery motions is not
subject to the common-law right of access, whereas discovery
material filed in connection with pretrial motions that require
judicial resolution of the merits is subject to the common-law
right.”77 That standard leaves unaddressed the status of nondiscovery, non-dispositive pretrial motions. Such motions, the Ninth
Circuit held in Center for Auto Safety, carry the public-access right
if they relate “more than tangentially” to the merits.78
The court held that the “old tradition” of open proceedings
requires the public be given presumptive access when the matter
bears on the parties’ substantive rights or obligations even where it
is not dispositive of their dispute.79 The court picked up on the
72
73
74
75

Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1135–36 (quoting Rushford, 846 F.2d at 252).
Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1180 (emphasis added).
Midland, 686 F.3d at 1119–20.
Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1101 (9th Cir.

2016).
76

Id. at 1095.
Chicago Tribune Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 263 F.3d 1304, 1312
(11th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added).
78
Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1101.
79
Id. at 1100–01. So too, in its Republic of Philippines decision ordering the
unsealing of documents related to bribery charges against Ferdinand Marcos, the
Third Circuit rejected the claim that the principles “allowing public access to
judicial proceedings and judicial records are inapplicable to material filed in
77
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Supreme Court’s statement in Seattle Times Company v. Rhinehart
that “[m]uch of the information that surfaces during pretrial
discovery may be unrelated, or only tangentially related, to the
underlying cause of action.”80 The detritus here is released as
byproduct of civil discovery’s liberal scope.81 The Ninth Circuit
adopted this phrase describing discovery matter when it ruled that
“public access will turn on whether the motion is more than
tangentially related to the merits of a case.”82
Under Center for Auto Safety, the presumption of access to court
records is strongest on dispositive motions83—but not limited to
such motions because a motion may relate more than tangentially to
the merits even if it is not dispositive in any sense.84 “Tangential”
means “peripheral” or only “slightly connected” to the subject at
hand.85 The Ninth Circuit’s rule suggests, therefore, that the only
support of a non-dispositive motion.” Republic of Philippines v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 949 F.2d 653, 660 (3d Cir. 1991). Markman patent rulings, and
exclusion of an expert’s damages theory, discussed below, are examples of
decisions that affect the parties’ substantive rights without disposing of their
dispute. See infra Parts II.A.i, II.D.
80
Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 33 (1984).
81
Id. at 34–35 (noting “liberality of pretrial discovery permitted”); see
Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978) (stating that
“discovery is not limited to issues raised by the pleadings, for discovery itself is
designed to help define and clarify the issues.”); Hawkins v. AT & T, 812 F.
App’x 215, 218 (5th Cir. 2020) (“Generally, the scope of discovery is broad and
permits the discovery of ‘any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s
claim or defense.’”) (citations omitted); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) advisory
committee’s note to 2015 amendment (clarifying proportionality factors and that
burden of responding to discovery “often . . . lies heavier on the party who has
more information”).
82
Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1101.
83
See id. at 1098; Greater Miami Baseball Club Ltd. P’ship v. Selig, 955 F.
Supp. 37, 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); see also Zapp v. Zhenli Ye Gon, 746 F. Supp. 2d
145, 148 (D.D.C. 2010) (opining that the presumption is “strongest”—
additionally or alternatively—“when the documents at issue are specifically
referred to in a trial judge’s public decision”) (internal quotation marks, citation,
and alterations omitted).
84
See Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1099–1101.
85
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 344 F.3d
1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (quoting THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE
DICTIONARY 1385 (3d ed. 1997)) (defining “tangential” as “merely touching or
slightly connected” or “only superficially relevant; divergent”); 2 THE NEW
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motions that do not trigger the right are those that have little
relevance or consequence to a party’s litigation position. Few such
motions are filed, as parties have little reason to expend resources
on a motion that will not advance their substantive position in the
case. Accordingly, the more-than-tangential rule lends a broad scope
to the access right.
Before Center for Auto Safety, a “more than tangentially related”
concept did not supply the rule of decision for when the presumption
of public access arises. The majority’s repeated statements that its
holding fits with the case law86 demonstrate that, regardless of
whether the dissent is correct that this holding “overtly overrules
[the Ninth Circuit’s] prior decisions,”87 the majority was seeking to
synthesize a principle that had never before been articulated in this
way. The dissent in Center for Auto Safety takes the court to task for
reducing a descriptive quality to a sufficient condition; the majority
opinion appears to reason that the compelling reasons test applies to
any motion more than tangentially related to the merits simply
because the reported decisions applying this test did so on a motion
having that characteristic.88 The dissent argues that the dispositive
vs. non-dispositive distinction is clearer and easier to administer,
whereas “district courts will have no framework for deciding what
quantum of relatedness is more than tangential.”89 Despite these
dissenting views, however, district courts have applied the rule of
Center for Auto Safety for several years without evident difficulty or
impairment of their powers to fashion suitable protective orders, and
the “more than tangential” rule controls in the Ninth Circuit.

SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 3215–16 (1993) (defining “tangential”
as “merely touching a subject or matter; peripheral”) (alterations omitted).
86
See Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1099 (maintaining that “[t]he focus
in all of our cases is on whether the motion at issue is more than tangentially
related to the underlying cause of action.”); id. at 1103 (repeating that “[o]ur
precedent . . . always has focused on whether the pleading is more than
tangentially related to the merits”).
87
Id. at 1109 (Ikuta, J., dissenting).
88
Id. at 1105.
89
Id. at 1107.
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D. How Does the Presumption Apply?
Under the compelling reasons test, unless a record is of a type
traditionally kept secret,90 the proponent of secrecy bears the burden
of showing that its disclosure “will work a clearly defined and
serious injury.”91 The proponent must “articulate compelling
reasons supported by specific factual findings that outweigh the
general history of access and the public policies favoring
disclosure.”92 If the proponent makes this particularized showing for
a certain item of evidence, the court balances that party’s interests
in keeping it secret against the public’s competing interests in
accessing it.93 The court may seal an item by finding a compelling
reason based in fact and not “rely[ing] on hypothesis or
conjecture.”94
Law-abiding companies should not fear application of this test.
Disclosure of past promotional ideas95 or historical financial data96
90

See Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir.

2006).
91

Shane Grp., Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 825 F.3d 299, 307
(6th Cir. 2016) (quoting In re Cendant Corp., 260 F.3d 183, 194 (3rd Cir. 2001)).
92
Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178–79 (alternations, quotation marks, and
citations omitted).
93
Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1096–97 (9th
Cir. 2016).
94
Id.
95
See Marietta Corp. v. Fairhurst, 301 A.D.2d 734, 738 (N.Y. App. Div.
2003); SDT Indus., Inc. v. Leeper, 793 So. 2d 327, 332 (La. Ct. App. 2001).
96
See Fox Sports Net North v. Minn. Twins P’ship, 319 F.3d 329, 336 (8th
Cir. 2003) (holding that “obsolete information cannot form the basis for a trade
secret claim because the information has no economic value.”); Marsteller v. MD
Helicopter Inc., No. CV-14-01788-PHX-DLR, 2018 WL 4679645, at *2 (D. Ariz.
Sept. 28, 2018) (declining to seal “pricing, compensation, and contract
information” based on “doubts about the concreteness of the harm [the defendant]
claim[ed] would result from public disclosure . . . given the age of this
information.”); F.T.C. v. DIRECTV, Inc., No. 15-CV-01129-HSG, 2017 WL
840379, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2017) (declining to seal historical pricing and
financial data and rejecting assertions of competitive harm); Saint Alphonsus
Med. Ctr.—Nampa, Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., No. 12-CV-00560-BLW,
2014 WL 3101716, at *3 (D. Idaho July 3, 2014) (finding “no compelling reason”
to seal evidence of a five-year-old business negotiation “[g]iven its age”), on
reconsideration in part, 2015 WL 632311 (D. Idaho Feb. 13, 2015); Clark v.
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is unlikely to cause competitive harm. And though the test is
stringent, compelling secrecy interests exist where disclosure will
reveal privileged information or trade secrets, jeopardize health or
other personally identifying information, threaten national security
or otherwise endanger lives, imperil an accused’s right to a fair trial,
intimidate a witness, or traumatize a juvenile crime victim.97
But the likelihood of reputational harm from disclosure of court
records does not justify sealing them: “Indeed, common sense tells
us that the greater the motivation a corporation has to shield its
operations, the greater the public’s need to know.”98 Hence despite
companies’ “natural desire” to shield embarrassing facts, complaints
of litigation-driven publicity, without more, are insufficient to
justify secrecy.99 For example, in a RICO case involving “massive
contamination” from hazardous waste,100 the defendant companies
opposed a motion to unseal the pleadings, claiming they would
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., No. CIV. 08-6197-DRD, 2011 WL 1833355, at *3
(D.N.J. May 13, 2011) (gathering earlier cases supporting the “general rule” that
“business information that is substantially out of date is unlikely to merit
protection”).
97
See NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Super. Ct., 980 P.2d 337, 368
n.46 (Cal. 1999); see also Hon. Lloyd Doggett & Michael Mucchetti, Public
Access to Public Courts: Discouraging Secrecy in the Public Interest, 69 TEX. L.
REV. 643, 669–77 (enumerating types of material that may merit sealing based on
a compelling countervailing interest).
98
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C., 710 F.2d 1165, 1180 (6th
Cir. 1983); see Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th
Cir. 2006) (“The mere fact that the production of records may lead to a litigant’s
embarrassment, incrimination, or exposure to further litigation will not, without
more, compel the court to seal its records.”) (citing Foltz v. State Farm Mutual
Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1136 (9th Cir. 2003)); State v. Cottman
Transmission Sys., Inc., 542 A.2d 859, 864 (Md. App. 1988) (“Possible harm to
a corporate reputation does not serve to surmount the strong presumption in favor
of public access to court proceedings and records. Injury to corporate or personal
reputation is an inherent risk in almost every civil suit.”) (internal citation
omitted).
99
Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179; Brown & Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1180; see,
e.g., Romero v. Drummond Co., Inc., 480 F.3d 1234, 1247 (11th Cir. 2007)
(reversing a sealing order for failure to substantiate the finding that permitting
access would further lawyers’ allegedly improper motives).
100
Huntsman-Christensen Corp. v. Entrada Indus., Inc., 639 F. Supp. 733,
734 (D. Utah 1986).
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suffer harm from disclosure of the complaint charging them with
conspiracy and fraud because their stock would drop and they would
lose investment money and opportunities.101 But the court wrote that
it “simply [did] not perceive the defendants’ or the public’s plight to
be extraordinary were the Complaint to be unsealed” and that
“[w]hen denial of access to court records deprives the public of
information or the ability to know, a stronger presumption of access
arises and the Court’s discretion is significantly curtailed.”102
In most disputes involving businesses, “[i]nformation may be
sealed from the public only if it is truly confidential, not generally
known, and its disclosure would likely cause [the business]
competitive harm.”103 Even trade secrets do not receive “automatic
and complete immunity against disclosure” but are instead
considered
“against
the
need
for
disclosure”
and
104
“[f]requently . . . have been afforded a limited protection.” For
101

Id. at 738.
Id. at 737, 738 n.5.
103
Krommenhock v. Post Foods, LLC, 334 F.R.D. 552, 587 (N.D. Cal. 2020)
(emphasis omitted); see also Willis v. United States, No. CV 117-015, 2019 WL
7194599, at *1 n.3 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 26, 2019) (discerning “no reason to seal this
already public document”); P&L Dev. LLC v. Bionpharma Inc., No.
1:17CV1154, 2019 WL 2079830, at *8 (M.D.N.C. May 10, 2019) (mandating
disclosure as “much of the information the parties sought to seal was already
public”). Publicly traded companies must disclose earnings and other financial
information every fiscal quarter on the SEC’s Form 10-Q and once per year on
Form 10-K. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m; 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 229 (2021).
104
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c) advisory committee’s note to 1970 amendment; see
Hartley Pen Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 287 F.2d 324, 328 (9th Cir. 1961) (“A trade
secret must and should be disclosed where upon a proper showing it is made to
appear that such disclosure is relevant and necessary to the proper presentation of
a plaintiff’s or defendant’s case.”); In re Apple Inc. Device Performance Litig.,
No. 5:18-MD-02827-EJD, 2019 WL 1767158, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2019);
infra note 111. A trade secret is information whose disclosure would result in
tangible economic loss. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076,
1090 (9th Cir. 1986) (“If an outsider would obtain a valuable share of the market
by gaining certain information, then that information may be a trade secret if it is
not known or readily ascertainable.”). To be a trade secret, information must also
be the subject of reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy. See Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (1984) (“Because of the intangible nature of a
trade secret, the extent of the property right therein is defined by the extent to
which the owner of the secret protects his interest from disclosure to others.”).
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act thus defines a trade secret as information that “(i)
102
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instance, at a 2014 trial that concerned an Idaho health care
provider’s acquisition of a physician group, the court initially sealed
“[c]urrent (within the last four years)” business information in four
categories, but as the trial progressed “the Court became convinced
that the original reasons for sealing certain material appeared less
compelling” and “[u]ltimately . . . decided to issue its Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law without any redactions.”105 Finally, if
a court finds a compelling reason to seal materials or proceedings,
the resulting redactions or procedures must be narrowly tailored to
protect that interest.106
The lower “good cause” standard applies to ordinary discovery
or administrative motions.107 In these settings, the court has broader
discretion to fashion orders to protect litigants and third parties from
“annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or
expense.”108 Discovery can “seriously implicate privacy interests of
litigants and third parties” if it unearths information that “if publicly
released could be damaging to reputation and privacy.”109
Nonetheless, the designating party must make a particularized
derives independent economic value . . . from not being generally known to, and
not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain
economic value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are
reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.” UNIFORM TRADE
SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIFORM STATE L. 1985).
105
Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.—Nampa, Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd.,
No. 1:12-CV-00560-BLW, 2014 WL 3101716, at *2 (D. Idaho July 3, 2014)
(internal citation omitted), on reconsideration in part, 2015 WL 632311 (D. Idaho
Feb. 13, 2015); see also Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.—Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s
Health Sys., Ltd., 778 F.3d 775, 781–82 (9th Cir. 2015).
106
See, e.g., In re NHL Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., MDL No. 14-2551
(SRN/JSM), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91111, at *12 (D. Minn. July 13, 2016)
(determining that redaction of names from medical records sufficiently protected
patient privacy interests); KlausTech, Inc. v. Google. Inc., No. 10-cv-05899-JSW
(DMR), 2017 WL 4808558, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2017) (describing how the
court, “[b]alancing the public’s right to access and Google’s interest in the
proprietary nature of its technology,” sealed the courtroom only during the
technical discussion at a hearing).
107
See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 33–37 (1984); United
States v. Kravetz, 706 F.3d 47, 54 (1st Cir. 2013); Bond v. Utreras, 585 F.3d 1061,
1073–76 (7th Cir. 2009); see also supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text.
108
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1).
109
Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 35.
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showing of “some plainly adequate reason” to protect each
record.110 Courts have extended protection under Rule 26 to current
customer and supplier information, sales and revenue data, business
plans, and other competitively sensitive information.111 Although
most discovery occurs “in private as a matter of modern practice,”112

110

8A Wright, Miller & Marcus, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2035 (3d
ed. 2010). “Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or
articulated reasoning” do not establish good cause—the sealing proponent “bears
the burden, for each particular document . . . of showing that specific prejudice or
harm will result” from disclosure. Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d
470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331
F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2003); FED. JUD. CTR., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
LITIGATION § 11.432, at 64–65 & n.136 (4th ed. 2004); In re Zyprexa Injunction,
474 F. Supp. 2d 385, 416 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (burden “rests at all times with the
party seeking protection.”); H.B. Fuller Co. v. Doe, 60 Cal. Rptr. 3d 501, 512 (Ct.
App. 2007) (sealing proponent “must come forward with a specific enumeration
of the facts sought to be withheld and specific reasons for withholding them.”).
111
See Momentive Specialty Chems., Inc. v. Alexander, No. 2:13-cv-275,
2013 WL 2287091, at *4 (S.D. Ohio May 23, 2013) (noting “[i]t is typical that
business plans containing competitively sensitive information be restricted, at
least in the first instance, to attorneys and not be shared with parties who work for
or might share information with the producing party’s competitors.”); Joint Stock
Soc. v. UDV N. Am., Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 390, 396 (D. Del. 2000) (adopting
magistrate judge’s recommendation to seal “vodka formulas, consumer research
studies, strategic plans, potential advertising and marketing campaigns or
financial information”); Nutratech, Inc. v. Syntech (SSPF) Int’l, Inc., 242 F.R.D.
552, 556 n.5 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (finding good cause to prevent disclosure of
“supplier/customer identities and cost/sales figures related to specific
suppliers/customers”). But see ATM Exp., Inc. v. ATM Exp., Inc., No. 07cv1293L (RBB), 2008 WL 4997600, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2008) (refusing to seal
deposition testimony regarding a party’s “finances, business, advertising and
promotional strategies, and its customer base”); Prod. Res. Grp., L.L.C. v.
Oberman, No. 03 Civ. 5366 (JGK), 2003 WL 22350939, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
27, 2003) (rejecting “contention that [a party’s] rebate programs and supplier
discounts [were] protectable trade secrets.”); Cudahy Co. v. Am. Labs., Inc., 313
F. Supp. 1339, 1343 (D. Neb. 1970) (declining to grant trade secret status to “data
on profits and costs of production” or to two customer lists); supra note 15.
112
Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 33.
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discovery materials remain presumptively public absent court
order113 and any redactions must be narrowly tailored.114
II. MOTIONS CARRYING THE PRESUMPTION OF ACCESS
In the Ninth Circuit today, as discussed above, the presumption
of access applies not just to literally dispositive motions but to
effectively dispositive motions as well, and further to all motions that
relate more than tangentially to the merits. “[S]ome” motions that
do not technically end the case “will pass” this test, the court in
Center for Auto Safety opined.115 But which motions are those? I
argue here that, beyond trial,116 summary judgment,117 and motions
to dismiss118—which are literally dispositive—motions to exclude
evidence, for a preliminary injunction or class certification, or to
define a central issue in dispute, as with Markman proceedings in
patent litigation, tend to dispose of the case and virtually always
concern its merits. Therefore, under Center for Auto Safety, the
compelling reasons test applies in these settings, among others.

113

San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct.—N. Dist. (San Jose), 187
F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing other appellate authorities). Florida law
deems deposition transcripts filed with the court publicly available, unless
otherwise ordered. See Tallahassee Democrat, Inc. v. Willis, 370 So. 2d 867, 870–
71 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
114
See, e.g., United States ex rel. Roberts v. QHG of Ind., Inc., No. 1:97CV-174, 1998 WL 1756728, at *8 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 8, 1998) (“Once the identifying
information is removed from the record, the patient’s privacy interest is
essentially eliminated.”) (citing cases); Finjan Inc. v. Sophos, Inc., No. 14-cv01197-WHO, 2016 WL 7911365, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2016) (approving use
of codenames to protect identities).
115
Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1101 (9th Cir.
2016).
116
Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1070 (3d Cir. 1984)
(citing Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982)).
117
Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135–36 (9th Cir.
2003) (citing Rushford v. New Yorker Mag., 846 F.2d 249, 252 (4th Cir. 1988)).
118
E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Instituut Voor Landbouw-En Visserijonderzoek,
No. 1:17-cv-00808-DAD-EPG, 2018 WL 3769410, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2018)
(denying defendants’ request to seal portions of their motion to dismiss and
pointing out that such a motion “is undoubtedly a dispositive motion” warranting
compelling reasons scrutiny).
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A. Motions to Exclude Evidence
Motions to exclude evidence from trial “may, in reality, be a part
of, or so nearly like the trial itself” as to trigger the constitutional
right to access119 and normally implicate the common law right.120
i. Daubert
Challenging subject matter intensifies the effect of expertwitness proceedings under Daubert121 or equivalent state law. The
trial court’s evidentiary determinations will be reviewed only for an
abuse of discretion—meaning reversal requires “a definite and firm
conviction” of a “clear error of judgment” in the ruling.122 That
Daubert decisions are unlikely to be disturbed vests the trial court
with broader authority, setting an expectation of finality from the
expert proceedings. Meanwhile, a fleet of economists and other
specialized experts stands at the ready, driving up costs and fueling
the parties’ impulse to use the expert to win the case.
A mistake can prove fatal, as in the mass tort litigation asserting
the blockbuster cholesterol drug Lipitor caused type 2 diabetes,
where the court dismissed claims because plaintiffs failed to
“produce an expert on specific causation that will survive

119

Nat’l Broad. Co., Inc., v. Presser, 828 F.2d 340, 354 (6th Cir. 1987); see
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 7 (1986) (holding that “the
First Amendment question cannot be resolved solely on the label we give the
event, i.e., ‘trial’ or otherwise”); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448
U.S. 555, 576 (1980) (discussing the public’s First Amendment right to receive
information).
120
See Amtower v. Photon Dynamics, Inc., 71 Cal. Rptr. 3d 361, 372 (Ct.
App. 2008) (“It has become increasingly common” for parties to enlist motions to
exclude evidence as a means of seeking to prevail); 1 EDWARD L. BIRNBAUM ET
AL., NEW YORK TRIAL NOTEBOOK § 13:02, at 13–3 (2010) (winning a pretrial
motion in limine prevents the adversary from talking about or introducing
damaging evidence, and can create settlement leverage). See also infra notes 130–
137 (in limine authorities) & 123–26 (Daubert authorities).
121
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
122
See, e.g., Wash. All. of Tech. Workers v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
857 F.3d 907, 911 (D.C. Cir. 2017); MTS Int’l, Inc. v. Comm’r, 169 F.3d 1018,
1022 (6th Cir. 1999).
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Daubert . . . .”123 If the exclusion of a plaintiff’s expert can end the
case, the defendant’s failure to exclude the plaintiff’s expert
“undoubtedly” may affect the defendant’s willingness to talk
settlement.124 Not only are expert opinions procured to advance a
party’s claim or defense,125 but allowing access to related motion
practice126 is also consistent with the liberal approach to admitting
expert evidence itself.
123

In re Lipitor (Atorvastatin Calcium) Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab.
Litig., 227 F. Supp. 3d 452, 491 (D.S.C. 2017), aff’d, 892 F.3d 624 (4th Cir. 2018).
124
Margaret A. Berger, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony, in FED. JUD.
CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 11, 19 (3d ed. 2011); see
David M. Flores et al., Examining the Effects of the Daubert Trilogy on Expert
Evidence Practices in Federal Civil Court: An Empirical Analysis, 34 S. ILL. U.
L.J. 533, 563 (2010) (the authors’ empirical study of federal cases in South
Carolina showed that “Daubert challenges targeted evidence central to the
plaintiff’s case and a settlement agreement was reached soon after the motions
were filed”).
125
See supra notes 120 & 123–24; infra note 126; cf. Ctr. for Auto Safety v.
Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1100–01 (holding that the right of access
arises when the matter bears on the parties’ substantive rights even where it is not
dispositive of their dispute) (citing Romero v. Drummond Co., Inc., 480 F.3d
1234, 1245–46 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044,
1050 (2d Cir. 1995)).
126
One federal court supervising a multidistrict proceeding alleging
deceptive marketing of an unsafe contraceptive device ordered the public release
of all documents filed under seal as part of the defendants’ Daubert motions, and
a New Jersey state court supervising parallel coordinated litigation issued a
similar order. See In re Nuvaring Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 4:08-md-01964-RWS
(E.D. Mo. Oct. 25, 2012), ECF No. 1390 at 2; In re Nuvaring Litig., No. BER-L3081-09 (N.J. Super. Ct., Bergen Cnty., Oct. 22, 2012). Another court found no
compelling reason to seal portions of an economist’s 372-page report regarding
“the crucial merits question of whether Qualcomm’s conduct had anticompetitive
effects.” F.T.C. v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 17-CV-00220-LHK, 2018 WL 6615298,
at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2018); see also In re Midland Nat. Life Ins. Co. Annuity
Sales Practices Litig., 686 F.3d 1115, 1119–20 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that the
compelling reasons test applied to a Daubert motion submitted, per common
practice, with a summary judgment motion, a result that followed from the court’s
practical recognition that “a Daubert motion connected to a pending summary
judgment motion may be effectively dispositive”) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted); Flores, supra note 124, at 563; In re Packaged Seafood Prods.
Antitrust Litig., No. 15-MD-2670 JLS (MDD), 2020 WL 5709269, at *1 (S.D.
Cal. Sept. 24, 2020) (enforcing open-records presumption to order Daubert
materials unsealed); Marsteller v. MD Helicopter Inc., No. CV-14-01788-PHX-
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While it disallows junk science, Federal Rule of Evidence 702
was framed “to relax traditional barriers to admission of expert
opinion testimony,” the Supreme Court made clear.127 An expert “is
permitted wide latitude to offer opinions, including those that are
not based on firsthand knowledge or observation,” and this relief
from the personal knowledge requirement “is premised on the
assumption that the expert’s opinion will have a reliable basis in the
knowledge and experience of his discipline.”128 In Daubert,
moreover, the Court specified “[v]igorous cross-examination,
presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the
burden of proof”—all historically open to the public—as
“the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but
admissible evidence.”129

DLR, 2018 WL 4679645, at *2 (D. Ariz. Sept. 28, 2018) (same); Hudock v. LG
Elecs. U.S.A., Inc., No. 0:16-CV-1220-JRT-KMM, 2020 WL 2848180, at *2 (D.
Minn. June 2, 2020) (citing cases and holding that Daubert motions “intertwined
with the ultimate merits of the claims” command the presumption of public
access).
127
Cary v. Auto. Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., 838 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1122
(D. Colo. 2011) (emphasis added) (citation omitted); Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588–89 (1993).
128
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 (citing FED. R. EVID. 702, 703). The Court
identified four factors that may bear on the analysis of reliability: (1) whether the
theory can be and has been tested; (2) whether the theory has been published
following peer review; (3) the theory’s known or potential error rate; and (4)
whether the theory is generally accepted in the relevant scientific community. See
id. at 593–94. Additional factors may include whether experts have adequately
accounted for obvious alternative explanations, and are being as careful as they
would be in their regular professional work outside the courtroom. See FED. R.
EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment.
129
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596. In general, “[w]hen the factual underpinning of
an expert’s opinion is weak, it is . . . a question to be resolved by the jury,”
Milward v. Acuity Specialty Prods. Grp., Inc., 639 F.3d 11, 22 (1st Cir. 2011)
(citations omitted), and “faults in his use of a differential etiology as a
methodology, or lack of textual authority for his opinion, go to the weight, not the
admissibility, of his testimony,” McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co., 61 F.3d 1038,
1044 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Hartley v. Dillard’s, Inc., 310 F.3d 1054, 1061 (8th
Cir. 2002).
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ii. In Limine

Motions to exclude key documents or lay-witness testimony also
cut to the heart of a case. Many a jury has been influenced by a
memorable description or other item of evidence recapitulated
during closing argument. Excluding such evidence may spell defeat
for the losing party, while admitting it may clinch the case for the
victor.130 A witness whose drinking problem or tainted blood test
comes out will have trouble getting past it, whether in a routine
matter or a larger controversy.131 In a trademark dispute between
manufacturers of thermal imaging equipment, the defendant
prevailed on false advertising counterclaims after the court
precluded the plaintiff in limine from introducing evidence that the
defendant misled the Patent and Trademark Office.132 More than
five years after plaintiffs filed wrongful death cases arising out of
the September 11th attacks, many of the cases settled soon after the
trial court excluded in limine estimates of a decedent’s earning
potential and other evidence.133
Parties use pretrial in limine motions to try to exclude prejudicial
evidence—colorful or mundane—before it “rings the bell” by being

130

See Robert Hornstein, Mean Things Happening in This Land: Defending
Third Party Criminal Activity Public Housing Evictions, 23 S.U. L. REV. 257,
267–68 (1996) (“The effective use of a motion in limine can be the determinative
factor in many cases.”); Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1099 & n.5 (explaining
that requests to exclude co-conspirator statements under Rule 801(d)(2)(E)—and
other “routine motions in limine—are strongly correlative to the merits of a
case”). See also supra note 120.
131
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 476–77 (2008) (Valdez
captain was drunk at the time of the oil spill).
132
See FLIR Sys., Inc. v. Sierra Media, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1188 (D.
Or. 2013) (post-trial opinion); Flir Sys., Inc. v. Fluke Corp., No. 3:10-CV-00971HU, 2012 WL 13054267, at *3 (D. Or. Nov. 29, 2012) (in limine order).
133
See In re Sept. 11 Litig., No. 21 MC 97 (AKH), 2007 WL 3036439, at
*2–5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2007); see also Joseph Ax, Factbox: The State of
September 11 Litigation, REUTERS (Sept. 9, 2011, 3:55 PM), https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-sept11-litigation/factbox-the-state-of-september-11litigation-idUSTRE7886N920110909 (reporting that “[m]ost of the cases in 21MC-97 were settled”).
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introduced before the jury.134 Excluding evidence in limine is
disfavored135 and courts issue terse orders reserving judgment on
multiple objections so that they can be resolved in their full context
at trial.136 In limine rulings, then, both substitute for and are subject
to later trial rulings.137 Based on the strong presumption that
disputes will be openly tried,138 third parties should be allowed to
134

See Charles W. Gamble, The Motion in Limine: A Pretrial Procedure
That Has Come of Age, 33 ALA. L. REV. 1, 3–8 (1981).
135
The court may not exclude evidence in limine unless is “clearly
inadmissible on all potential grounds.” Rivera v. Robinson, 464 F. Supp. 3d 847,
853 (E.D. La. 2020); Leonard v. Stemtech Health Scis., Inc., 981 F. Supp. 2d 273,
276 (D. Del. 2013); United States v. Gonzalez, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1341, 1345 (S.D.
Fla. 2010); Indiana Ins. Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 326 F. Supp. 2d 844, 846 (N.D.
Ohio 2004); United States v. Paredes, 176 F. Supp. 2d 179, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2001);
Hawthorne Partners v. AT & T Techs., Inc., 831 F. Supp. 1398, 1400 (N.D. Ill.
1993).
136
See Regassa v. United States, No. 4:14-CV-01122, 2020 WL 2342982, at
*2 (M.D. Pa. May 11, 2020) (“[M]otions in limine often present issues for which
final decision is best reserved for a specific trial situation.”) (quoting Walden v.
Ga.-Pac. Corp., 126 F.3d 506, 518 n.10 (3d Cir. 1997)); Mendelsohn v.
Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 587 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1208 (D. Kan. 2008) (although
in limine rulings can save time, cost, effort, and preparation, the court is usually
better situated during trial to assess evidence) (citing Sperberg v. Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co., 519 F.2d 708, 712 (6th Cir. 1975)), aff’d, 402 F. App’x 337 (10th
Cir. 2010); Deere & Co. v. FIMCO Inc., 260 F. Supp. 3d 830, 834 (W.D. Ky.
2017) (unless evidence “is ‘patently inadmissible for any purpose’ . . . the ‘better
practice’ is to defer evidentiary rulings until trial, so that ‘questions of foundation,
relevancy and potential prejudice may be resolved in proper context.’”) (internal
citations omitted).
137
Denial of a motion in limine “simply means that, without the benefit of
the proper context of trial, the Court cannot determine that the evidence in
question is clearly inadmissible.” Leonard, 981 F. Supp. 2d at 277 n.3. Decisions
on these motions accordingly are “subject to change when the case unfolds,
particularly if the actual testimony differs from what was contained in
the . . . proffer.” Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 (1984).
138
“[T]he public has an ‘especially strong’ right of access to evidence
introduced in trials,” United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1049 (2d Cir. 1995)
(citations omitted), as “historically both civil and criminal trials have been
presumptively open,” Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580
n.17 (1980); see Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1070–71 (3d Cir.
1984). Advocates in ancient Rome made their case in the Forum atop the Rostra,
an eleven-foot-high platform decorated with the beaks of captured enemy ships.
See SAMUEL BALL PLATNER, A TOPOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF ANCIENT ROME
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see evidence proffered before trial to the same extent as if its
admissibility were challenged at trial.139
B. Motions for a Preliminary Injunction
Under Center for Auto Safety, absent a compelling
countervailing reason, documents and testimony presented with a
preliminary injunction request must be made public,140 for a
decision on whether to issue a preliminary injunction concerns the
merits of the plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief.141
In contrast to a temporary restraining order, a preliminary
injunction can only be entered after notice to the defendant and, if
material facts are disputed, a hearing.142 When relief is granted the
defendant is enjoined and the matter may conclude from that
basis.143 Denial of preliminary relief also makes final injunctive
450–51 (1929); J. HENRY MIDDLETON, THE REMAINS OF ANCIENT ROME 244–46
(1892).
139
See, e.g., Cramton v. Grabbagreen Franchising LLC, No. CV-17-04663PHX-DWL, 2020 WL 7264302, at *1 (D. Ariz. Feb. 26, 2020) (ordering unsealing
of motions in limine based on failure to satisfy compelling reasons test); United
States v. Martoma, No. S1 12 CR 973 PGG, 2014 WL 164181, at *5 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 9, 2014) (applying “the strong presumption of public access that attaches to
motion in limine papers submitted to a court in connection with a criminal
proceeding”); Fitzgerald v. Gonzales, No. 04-CV-00421-MSK-OES, 2006 WL
8454031, at *1 (D. Colo. Feb. 8, 2006) (finding “no compelling reasons for the
motion in limine to be filed under seal.”).
140
Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1099–1101
(9th Cir. 2016); see also Republic of Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
949 F.2d 653, 660 (3d Cir. 1991).
141
See Maggie Wittlin, Meta-Evidence and Preliminary Injunctions, 10 UC
IRVINE L. REV. 1331, 1331 (2020) (calling preliminary injunction decisions
“enormously consequential”); Lenihan v. City of New York, 640 F. Supp. 822,
825 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (referring to “the crucial preliminary injunction hearing.”).
142
FED. R. CIV. P. 65(a); Cobell v. Norton, 391 F.3d 251, 261 (D.C. Cir.
2004).
143
See, e.g., Miller v. Rich, 845 F.2d 190, 191 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that
“in this case, the denial of the preliminary injunction effectively decided the
merits of the case.”); Yablonski v. United Mine Workers of Am., 466 F.2d 424,
431 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (concluding that “the preliminary injunction was the critical
step and procured all the relief required”); Vincent v. Local 294, Int’l Bhd. of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am., No. 70-CV-244, 1970
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relief unlikely, absent different evidence or changed circumstances,
given the failure to satisfy the likelihood-of-success factor.
Although the initial decree does not bind the court, often “the facts
are sufficiently developed on the preliminary injunction hearing and
the court may proceed to issue a permanent decree if the parties have
no further evidence to present.”144 Further reflecting the import of
preliminary injunctions, they can be immediately appealed.145
C. Motions for Class Certification
Though procedural in nature, class certification may induce
settlement because allowing the affected group to proceed as a unit
risks larger exposure for the defendant.146 And denial of class
certification may sink the case, with the decision being “effectively
dispositive” since “the stakes of the litigation are such that
proceeding individually would not be viable from a practical
perspective.”147 The provision governing most class actions for
WL 758, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 1970) (noting that “a preliminary injunction is
of critical importance, often decisive by its timing and impact and its grant may
render illusory under certain circumstances the right to hearing later on the
merits.”).
144
DAN B. DOBBS, REMEDIES: DAMAGES—EQUITY—RESTITUTION § 2.10
(1973).
145
28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).
146
See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 470, 476 (1978); In re
Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 145 (2d Cir. 2001)
(Sotomayor, J.) (observing that settlement pressure is “a fact of life for class action
litigants”), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Brown v. Kelly,
609 F.3d 467, 483 n.17 (2d Cir. 2010); Il Fornaio (Am.) Corp. v. Lazzari Fuel
Co., LLC, No. C 13-05197 WHA, 2015 WL 2406966, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 20,
2015) (reporting that, “[a]fter class certification, all parties promptly settled”
claims for price fixing). It was largely in response to this pressure that the class
action rule was amended to allow petitions for discretionary review of
certification decisions. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) advisory committee’s note to
1998 amendment; Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 137 S. Ct. 1702, 1709–10 (2017).
147
In re Seagate Tech. LLC, 326 F.R.D. 223, 246 (N.D. Cal. 2018); see Klay
v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1275 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding settlement
pressure irrelevant to the certification analysis and noting the pressure is mutual:
“[W]hile affirming certification may induce some defendants to settle,
overturning certification may create similar ‘hydraulic’ pressures on the plaintiffs,
causing them to either settle or—more likely—abandon their claims altogether”),
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damages148 responds to the same policy problem—“small recoveries
do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo
action”149—an economic reality that makes it important to disclose
the case record to individual class members,150 including so they can
“intelligently” decide whether to opt out to avoid being bound by
the judgment.151
When inquiring into whether common or individualized issues
will predominate in damage suits, the court considers which issues
will be “more prevalent or important” under the cause of action.152
The court consequently receives and evaluates evidence purportedly
abrogated in part on other grounds by Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co.,
553 U.S. 639 (2008); Davidson v. Apple, Inc., No. 16-CV-04942-LHK, 2019 WL
2548460, at *17 (N.D. Cal. June 20, 2019) & ECF No. 398 at 2 (N.D. Cal. July 3,
2019) (days after the court denied class certification based on flaws in their
expert’s damages model, plaintiffs alleging an iPhone touchscreen defect dropped
their claims); FED. JUD. CTR., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 11.213, at 40
(4th ed. 2004) (“Denial of class certification may effectively end the litigation.”).
148
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). It bears emphasis that “many cases in public
policy spheres, such as employment practices, free speech, and other matters, may
have importance far beyond the monetary amount involved.” FED. R. CIV. P.
26(b)(1) advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment (citation omitted). Class
actions for injunctive relief also may ring “heavy overtones of public interest.”
Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 32–33 (5th Cir. 1968).
149
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (citation
omitted).
150
See In re Cendant Corp., 260 F.3d 183, 193 (3d Cir. 2001). Class
members have an interest in monitoring the litigation and are expressly permitted
to enter an appearance through a lawyer of their own choosing. See FED. R. CIV.
P. 23(c)(2)(B)(iv).
151
Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1024 (9th Cir. 1998), overruled
on other grounds by Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011); see
also In re CenturyLink Sales Practices & Sec. Litig., No. CV 17-2832, 2020 WL
3512807, at *4 (D. Minn. June 29, 2020) (the rule contemplates “each class
plaintiff will make an informed, individualized decision whether to opt out, and
courts want to encourage this careful decisionmaking process.”) (quoting Hallie
v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 2:12-CV-00235-PPS, 2015 WL 1914864, at *4
(N.D. Ind. Apr. 27, 2015)).
152
Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1045 (2016) (quoting
2 William B. Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions § 4:49 (5th ed. 2012)); see
Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 563 U.S. 804, 809 (2011) (the
predominance inquiry “begins, of course, with the elements of the underlying
cause of action”).
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central to the grievance,153 such as evidence of the alleged violation
to which the class was exposed. The court then assesses whether the
same evidence plaintiffs would use to show liability shows the
prevalence of common proof, taking into account variations in how
individual class members are situated.154 “A critical need is to
determine how the case will be tried” and “[a]lthough an evaluation
of the probable outcome on the merits is not properly part of the
certification decision, discovery . . . often includes information
required to identify the nature of the issues that actually will be
presented at trial.”155 For these reasons, courts bound by Center for
Auto Safety have held that class certification proceedings are
presumptively open.156
D. Markman Proceedings
Just as class certification, without being technically dispositive,
may realize the threat posed by a case, so do Markman hearings take

153

See supra Part I.B.
See Krakauer v. Dish Network, L.L.C., 925 F.3d 643, 655 (4th Cir. 2019);
Rutstein v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 211 F.3d 1228, 1234 (11th Cir. 2000).
155
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1) advisory committee’s note to 2003 amendment;
see Wal‒Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350–51 (2011) (stating that the
“rigorous analysis” of whether the plaintiff has met the requirements for
certification “[f]requently . . . will entail some overlap with the merits of the
plaintiff’s underlying,” “enmeshed” cause of action) (emphasis added) (citing
Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160–61 (1982)); Amgen Inc. v.
Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 466 (2013).
156
See, e.g., Adtrader, Inc. v. Google LLC, No. 17-CV-07082-BLF, 2020
WL 6387381, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2020) (“follow[ing] numerous other
district courts within the Ninth Circuit in concluding that the compelling reasons
standard applies to motions to seal documents relating to class certification.”);
Fitzhenry-Russell v. Dr. Pepper Snapple Grp., Inc., 326 F.R.D. 592, 617 (N.D.
Cal. 2018) (holding that, as a class certification motion is “more than tangentially
related to the merits of the case,” the compelling reasons test applies); Moussouris
v. Microsoft Corp., No. 15-CV-1483 JLR, 2018 WL 1159251, at *2–5 (W.D.
Wash. Feb. 16, 2018) (applying compelling reasons test to class certification
motion under Center for Auto Safety), report & rec. adopted, 2018 WL 1157997
(W.D. Wash. Mar. 1, 2018); Baker v. SeaWorld Ent., Inc., No. 14CV2129-MMA
(AGS), 2017 WL 5029612, at *2–3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2017) (same).
154
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center stage in high-stakes patent litigation.157 Every patent “must
describe the exact scope of the invention and its manufacture,” both
to “secure to the patentee all to which he is entitled” and “to apprise
the public of what is still open to them.”158 In a Markman decision,
the court construes the meaning and reach of the language the patent
holder used to publicly disclose the invention, providing notice
against infringing use.159 The court thus interprets a public
document at the heart of the lawsuit, and “the public interest . . . is
dominant in the patent system.”160 It follows that the public should
be entitled to access Markman proceedings and information, except
when secrecy is needed to protect genuine trade secrets.
By resolving a core substantive issue—how far the patent’s
claims extend—Markman decisions settle the parties’ expectations.
“Indeed, a Markman hearing and claim construction order are two
of the most important and time-intensive substantive tasks a district
157

Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996); see
Jonathan H. Ashtor, Opening Pandora’s Box: Analyzing the Complexity of U.S.
Patent Litigation, 18 YALE J. L. & TECH. 217, 225 (2016) (Markman hearings are
“key events”); Peter E. Heuser & Robert A. Shlachter, Patent Litigation: If You’re
Going to Do It, Do It Right, OR. ST. BAR BULLETIN (Apr. 2009), https://
www.osbar.org/publications/bulletin/09apr/tips.html (“[T]he Markman hearing is
a critical juncture in the life of a patent lawsuit.”); Michael A. O’Shea, A
Changing Role for the Markman Hearing: In Light of Festo IX, Markman
Hearings Could Become M-F-G Hearings Which Are Longer, More Complex and
Ripe for Appeal, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 843, 843 (2004) (claim construction is
“[t]he most hotly contested issue in virtually every patent litigation” and “[t]he
significance of Markman to patent litigation cannot be underestimated”).
158
Markman, 517 U.S. at 373 (quoting McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419,
424 (1891)) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).
159
See id.; 35 U.S.C. § 112.
160
Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 665 (1944).
Courts do not construe patents broadly; instead “[i]t is the responsibility of patent
applicants to disclose their inventions adequately.” N. Am. Vaccine, Inc. v. Am.
Cyanamid Co., 7 F.3d 1571, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 112); see
Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Marchon Eyewear, Inc., 672 F.3d 1335, 1349 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (affirming narrow construction of “adapted to” phrase in patent claims for
sunglass lenses magnetically secured to primary frames); Athletic Alternatives,
Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc., 73 F.3d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that,
“[w]here there is an equal choice between a broader and a narrower meaning of a
claim, and there is an enabling disclosure that indicates that the applicant is at
least entitled to a claim having the narrower meaning, we consider the notice
function of the claim to be best served by adopting the narrower meaning.”).
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court undertakes in a patent case,” the Federal Circuit observed.161
Deciding the claim interpretation issue tends to decide the
subsequent, connected infringement issue.162 And the hearings
themselves resemble bench trials, with extensive argument or live
testimony.163
E. Summary; Other Motions and Postures
Pretrial motions on the admissibility of evidence, entry of a
preliminary injunction, certification of a class, and interpretation of
161

In re Apple Inc., 979 F.3d 1332, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2020); see, e.g., Lonestar
Inventions, L.P. v. Sony Elecs. Inc., No. 6:10-CV-588-LED-JDL, 2011 WL
3880550, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2011) (court “invested a considerable amount
of time analyzing the patent including holding a Markman hearing”). Most judges
rely on the lawyers to educate them, but they also may designate a special
independent expert or a technical advisor to help translate the concepts and
materials. See Andrew T. Zidel, Patent Claim Construction in the Trial Courts: A
Study Showing the Need for Clear Guidance from the Federal Circuit, 33 SETON
HALL L. REV. 711, 732 (2003); FED. R. EVID. 706; Reilly v. United States, 863
F.2d 149, 155–57 (1st Cir. 1988).
162
See Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 894 F. Supp.
844, 859 (D. Del. 1995); see also General Mills v. Hunt-Wesson Inc., 917 F. Supp.
663, 667 (D. Minn. 1996) (“Markman makes clear that the proper construction of
a claim can make short work of the question of infringement.”), aff’d, 103 F.3d
978 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Frank M. Gasparo, Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.
and Its Procedural Shock Wave: The Markman Hearing, 5 J.L. & POL’Y 723, 724
(1997) (“[T]he interpretation of a patent’s claims usually determines which party
will be victorious at trial.”).
163
See, e.g., JVI, Inc. v. Truckform Inc., No. CIV. 11-6218 FLW, 2012 WL
6708169, at *1 (D.N.J. Dec. 26, 2012) (“After reviewing the parties’ substantial
briefing and exhibits, and holding a full-day Markman hearing,” the court
construed a patent for concrete-block connectors); j2 Glob. Commc’ns, Inc. v.
EasyLink Servs. Int’l Corp., No. CV 09-04189 DDP (AJWx), 2011 WL 1532048,
at *2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2011) (court “conducted a lengthy Markman hearing”
on messaging technology patents “with extensive briefing” in advance); LifeScan,
Inc. v. Home Diagnostics, Inc., 103 F. Supp. 2d 345, 362–63 (D. Del. 2000)
(proceedings entailed “extensive Markman briefing by both parties and a lengthy
Markman hearing”), aff’d, 13 F. App’x 940 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see also Jerry A.
Riedinger, Markman Twenty Years Later: Twenty Years of Unintended
Consequences, 10 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 249, 273 (2015) (Markman
proceedings have “ranged from long evidentiary hearings, to attorney arguments,
to written submissions”).
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a patent may dispose of the suit and almost always go to its merits
more than tangentially. With these motions, therefore, courts
applying Center for Auto Safety should treat the case file as being
presumptively open. Other merits-related proceedings carrying the
public access right include motions for relief from a judgment, for a
directed verdict or new trial,164 or to quash an indictment or suppress
evidence in a criminal case,165 as well as search warrant
applications166 and meetings of creditors in bankruptcy court.167 The
presumption of access may also apply to the records submitted with
many other non-discovery motions, such as motions to intervene;
transfer venue; dismiss for lack of jurisdiction or failure to join an
indispensable party; issue emergency relief; reconsider an order;
certify an interlocutory appeal; stay or consolidate actions; or
bifurcate issues or parties.168
164

See, e.g., Sisk v. Abbott Labs., No. 1:11-CV-00159-MR-DLH, 2014 WL
1874976, at *2 (W.D.N.C. May 9, 2014) (nixing request of “parties [that] s[ought]
the wholesale filing under seal of the trial transcript and the entirety of these posttrial proceedings.”); United States v. French, No. 1:12-CR-00160-JAW, 2017 WL
27932, at *1–3 (D. Me. Jan. 3, 2017) (overruling objection to disclosing materials
submitted with motion for new trial).
165
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (removing such criminal motions from
magistrate judge jurisdiction); cf. Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46–47 (1984)
(assessing a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial and
concluding that “[t]he need for an open proceeding may be particularly strong
with respect to suppression hearings.”); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court,
464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984) (remarking that “the primacy of the accused’s right is
difficult to separate from the right of everyone in the community to attend the voir
dire which promotes fairness.”).
166
See, e.g., United States v. Sealed Search Warrants, 868 F.3d 385, 390–96
(5th Cir. 2017) (discussing case law relevant to accessing criminal warrant
materials); In re Application of Newsday, Inc., 895 F.2d 74, 79 (2d Cir. 1990)
(holding that a search warrant application is “a public document subject to a
common law right of access”); Cowles Publ’g Co. v. Murphy, 637 P.2d 966, 969
(Wash. 1981) (explaining that “[a]ccess to search warrants and affidavits of
probable cause can reveal how the judicial process is conducted.”).
167
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 341, 343.
168
See Estate of Levingston v. Cnty. of Kern, No. 1:16-cv-00188-DAD-JLT,
2017 WL 4700015, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2017) (stating that under Center
for Auto Safety, the access presumption may apply to “motions for preliminary
injunction, for sanctions, or in limine” and applying the presumption to a petition
for approval of a minor’s compromise of claims); Cont’l Auto. Sys., Inc. v.
Avanci, LLC, No. 19-CV-02520-LHK, 2019 WL 6612012, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec.
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CONCLUSION
Access to judicial records has added value and importance
today, when even more cases are settling before trial and internetbased dockets allow people to conveniently read material online.169
In addition to reviewing court documents, people can now watch
hearings over the web.170 But while these developments promote
accountability, only if actual evidence is available can the public
stay informed and the open-records policies be upheld.171
Documents rather than testimony typically provide the best
evidence in commercial controversies, and exposure of wrongdoing
remains essential to achieving appropriate reform and redress.
5, 2019) (applying the access presumption to a motion to transfer venue under 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a)); Coleman v. Brown, No. 2:90-cv-0520 KJM DB P, 2018 WL
5292744, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2018) (access presumption applied to the report
of a correctional department’s psychiatrist even though it was not filed by a party
or as part of a motion); In re Estate of Campbell, 106 P.3d 1096, 1105–08 (Haw.
2005) (access presumption applied to probate proceedings).
169
See supra note 17. Dockets themselves constitute judicial records, and
“[i]t would make little sense to provide public access to court documents but not
to the indices that record them and thus make them accessible.” In re Leopold,
964 F.3d 1121, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2020). On December 8, 2020, the House of
Representatives approved and sent on to the Senate a bill that would make the
federal courts’ PACER electronic case-filing system free for most citizens. See
Open Courts Act of 2020, H.R. 8235, 116th Cong. (2019–20). Also in 2020, the
Federal Circuit, in a class action asserting PACER should be free, affirmed a
ruling that the federal judiciary improperly spent almost $200 million in PACER
fees. See Nat’l Veterans Legal Servs. Program v. United States, 968 F.3d 1340,
1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
170
See Alison Frankel, Five Big Business Litigation Questions for 2021,
REUTERS (Jan. 3, 2021, 3:30 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-otc2021/five-big-business-litigation-questions-for-2021-idUSKBN2980NE (noting
that “COVID-19 forced courts to adopt procedures that have opened their
proceedings to member of the public who would otherwise not have been able to
see or hear them.”); Dorothy Atkins, Settling on Zoom: The Rise of Pro Se MDL
Objectors, LAW360 (Dec. 22, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1337218
/settling-on-zoom-the-rise-of-pro-se-mdl-objectors
(describing
how
the
democratizing effect of this pandemic-induced development in legal practice is
amplified when citizens not only can watch but can also air their views to the court
via Zoom).
171
See supra Part I.A (discussing the public’s right to access court
documents).
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Documents obtained by journalists show that Exxon and Shell knew
for decades but denied that fossil-fuel emissions were causing
climate change.172 Leaked documents suggest Purdue Pharma
deliberately concealed information about the potency and addictive
qualities of OxyContin.173 E-mails produced to Congress show that
Facebook’s CEO sought to acquire rivals because “if they grow to a
large scale they could be very disruptive . . . . [W]e can likely
always just buy any competitive startups.”174
Documents produced in complex litigation typically receive
blanket protection, meaning they cannot be seen by a third party
even if they are not, in fact, confidential.175 This incongruous state
of affairs disserves the tradition and policy of open litigation. Yet
the practice of over-designating business records under an
“umbrella” protective order seems here to stay.176 Worse, “too often,
172

See Neela Banerjee et al., Exxon: The Road Not Taken, INSIDE CLIMATE
NEWS (2015), https://insideclimatenews.org/book/exxon-the-road-not-taken/;
Benjamin Franta, Shell and Exxon’s Secret 1980s Climate Change Warnings, THE
GUARDIAN (Sept. 19, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/climateconsensus-97-per-cent/2018/sep/19/shell-and-exxons-secret-1980s-climatechange-warnings; Ashley Braun, An Illustrated History of What Big Oil Knew
About Climate Change—Before the Moon Landing, DESMOG (Mar. 3, 2019),
https://www.desmogblog.com/2019/03/03/illustrated-history-americanpetroleum-institute-oil-knew-climate-change.
173
See PATRICK RADDEN KEEFE, EMPIRE OF PAIN: THE SECRET HISTORY OF
THE SACKLER DYNASTY (2021).
174
E-mail from Mark Zuckerberg (Feb. 27, 2012) (listed with House
Committee on the Judiciary under FB-HJC-ACAL-00063220–22), available at
https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/0006322000063223.pdf; E-mail from
Mark Zuckerberg (Apr. 9, 2012) (listed with House Committee on the Judiciary
under FB-HJC-ACAL-00067600), available at https://judiciary.house.gov
/uploadedfiles/0006760000067601.pdf.
175
See supra notes 6, 10, 17 & 41 and accompanying text.
176
See Sorin Grp. USA, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., S.C., Inc., No. CV 14-4023
(RHK/JJK), 2015 WL 12803580, at *5 (D. Minn. Apr. 15, 2015) (ruing the
“tendency for parties to over-designate materials in litigation as confidential when
the court enters a blanket protective order”); Minter v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
No. CIV WMN-07-3442, 2010 WL 5418910, at *7 (D. Md. Dec. 23, 2010)
(concluding that over-designation imposes burdens by “mak[ing] litigation more
expensive and more complicated without worthwhile purpose”); Prescient
Acquisition Grp., Inc. v. MJ Pub. Tr., 487 F. Supp. 2d 374, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(criticizing “wholesale over-designation of materials” and unsealing summary
judgment exhibits sua sponte); THK Am., Inc. v. NSK Co., 157 F.R.D. 637, 645
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judicial records are sealed without any showing that secrecy is
warranted,” resulting in “a gradual, sub silentio erosion of public
access to the judiciary, erosion that occurs with such drop-by-drop
gentleness as to be imperceptible,” a federal appeals court warned
in 2021.177 To counter this antidemocratic trend, particularly given
litigants’ incentives to seal as described in the Introduction, judges
should question attempts to redact any filed document other than for
personal information such as birthdates or social security
numbers.178
The Ninth Circuit’s “more than tangential” standard sets a low
bar for mandatory “compelling reasons” review and can be applied
to ensure dockets are presumptively open and cases litigated
transparently. Documents filed with redactions that do not rise to the
level of trade secrets should be promptly unsealed.

(N.D. Ill. 1993) (sanctioning parties for designating documents highly
confidential in bulk); see also Endo, supra note 41, at 1253 (noting that
suppression of information obtained in discovery “may reduce necessary
coordination with outside experts, socially beneficial private enforcement, and
oversight over the courts themselves.”).
177
Le v. Exeter Fin. Corp., 990 F.3d 410, 421 (5th Cir. 2021) (italicization
added); see also Stoller, supra note 9 (“Today, big business in America is far too
secretive, with an endless thicket of confidentiality rules, trade secrets law, and
deferential judges . . . . [who] redact way too many details, often protecting what
they perceive as business proprietary information but [what] is in fact simply
evidence of cheating.”).
178
See FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2(a) (permitting redactions from court filings of
birthdates, names of minors, and social security, taxpayer identification, and
financial account numbers).

